Entretien avec Robert Hunter : Sharing power in Nato, an ongoing battle

Nommé par Bill Clinton en juillet 1993 ambassadeur américain auprès de l’OTAN, Robert Hunter est l’un des principaux artisans mais aussi l’un des plus fins connaisseurs des réformes en cours dans le cadre de l’Alliance atlantique. Il explore ici les passerelles possibles entre l’Union de l’Europe occidentale (UEO), le futur bras armé de l’Europe, et l’OTAN. En cas de refus des Américains d’intervenir, l’UEO pourrait ainsi servir de "police d’assurance" aux Européens. Le but étant d’intégrer la nouvelle identité européenne de défense et de sécurité dans le traité de l’Atlantique Nord réformé où tous les commandements stratégiques seront équitablement répartis entre Européens et Américains afin d’éviter la création de deux organisations parallèles de défense.

Groupe des BELLES FEUILLES : Could you comment on the recent controversy between France and the US over command issues within NATO ?

 Robert HUNTER : First, let me say that the United States is a strong supporter of a functioning and effective European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI). We are a strong supporter of the Western European Union (WEU). We like the idea of European allies taking greater responsibility within NATO. We are interested in rebalancing the Alliance,as well as in greater Europeanization of commands. Over time, we made a number of suggestions about ways of doing that. Now, as for France, we value its role in the Alliance and the prospect that it will rejoin the integrated military structure of a reformed and modernized NATO. The US will continue to work to help make that possible.

GBF : Should the Europeans be given regional commands ?

RH : We are working on a long term study to try resolve all the command questions and to make the Alliance relevant to the post Cold War era. That will include two new strategic commands that are derived from the old NATO commands. One is in Norfolk (SACLANT) and one in Mons, Belgium (SHAPE), both commanded by Americans at the request of the other allies. We are still working on how to do the regional commands, within both allied command Atlantic and allied command Europe. There has been a difference of view on how the European Southern command should be organized. One view is that this should be a European commander. The American view is that the commander-in-chief position should continue to be an American. We believe this not only because of the importance and the role of the US sixth fleet, but also because of the weight of American strategic power and engagement in the Balkans and the Middle East, and because of the need to sustain the support of the US Congress for this commitment.

To avoid creating two NATOS

GBF : How do you see the European Security and Defense Identity (ESDI) shaping itself in the coming months ?

RH : There were two major decisions, one by President Bill Clinton in January 1994 to support ESDI strongly. The second major decision was taken by President Jacques Chirac in December 1995, to have France reenter the integrated military command structure of a reformed NATO. Chirac said: "If NATO changes sufficiently, we will reenter". We heard that, and we are trying to respond. The French also stated that they wanted to create the ESDI, not outside NATO or in opposition to it, but inside NATO… They don’t want to do this to severe the Transatlantic link but to reinforce it. The idea is not to create two NATOS but one NATO and not to keep SACEUR out of the command chain. There is no disagreement on this issue. In Berlin, last June, we made major progress. In fact, as part of an overall package, there will be a major commitment of NATO assets that could be used by WEU. WEU has told us the things it might like to do. We are now doing the planning at NATO on how to implement this package. There will be one set of plans: maybe WEU could do them, maybe NATO could do them. At NATO, we will go through the command structures and we will identify NATO officers who could also work for WEU. The principle must be that, if and when they work for WEU, NATO must still be able to function.

GBF : Could you be more detailed on this last point ?

RH : We are developing Combined Joint Task Forces (CJTF) which could be used by NATO or transferred to WEU. We have also said that the Deputy SACEUR, who is a European, would not only be in charge of planning, but if indeed there were a transfer of NATO assets — including officers — to WEU, this man could become the WEU strategic commander. This has already been worked out, but it is subject to a decision on the whole package. Within NATO, we will create a CJTF headquarters with officers identified for two jobs, including even Deputy SACEUR. If WEU requested NATO assets and the North Atlantic Council agreed, then all these assets would move over the WEU. This will be worked out in advance. If you were a NATO officer working at allied command Europe in Brunsum, your regular job would be NATO and your extra job could be WEU.

WEU : an insurance policy for Europe

GBF : These arrangements sound very complicated ! Could they mean that America is willing to slowly disengage from Europe ?

RH : No. We are responding to a European request to develop an ESDI. American opinion, which used to be lukewarm on this matter, is now clearly positive. We offered to help and have been saying "yes" to nearly all questions that are asked. We at NATO — all 16 of us — have been working to make it possible for the WEU actually to do something effective. Now WEU can do whatever it likes, with its own resources, but there are some things it doesn’t have — large transport aircraft, sophisticated communi-cations, some kind of intelligence, a headquarters, generals, etc. WEU could go ahead and spend the money to acquire these things, but that would be a waste of time and money. What we are saying at NATO, including the US, is that, instead of spending resources to build something separate, we should build it within NATO. If WEU wants to borrow it, it can…

GBF : It can borrow "it" but under which conditions ? Would the members of WEU have to pay for it ?

RH : That has to be worked out. But there is no dispute on the basic idea. What we are organizing is a way to work out these arrangements in advance. It sounds complicated but, when it is done, everyone in NATO will know what he or she will do. We will have identified the assets, identified the headquarters, identified the officers. So if, in the middle of the night, there is a crisis, and WEU says it would like to use these assets and NATO does not want to undertake the operation, WEU will be able to do so.

GBF : When you say "NATO", do you mean if "America" does not want to do this ?

RH : Or perhaps the Turks, the Norwegians, the Icelanders, or the Canadians. Whatever the case, this is not an effort by the Americans to disengage. Our support of ESDI is based on several points. One, it helps give Europeans more responsibility for their defense: it helps underscore that European take defense seriously. It also helps tell our Congress that we are helping Europeans to help themselves. We Americans believe we will stay here. We believe we will be involved in everything that seriously affects security. Maybe not all Europeans believe that. To reassure Europeans on this point, the WEU is now becoming an insurance policy. If the Americans for some reasons did not want to be engaged through NATO, Europe would still have this arrangement that can work.

"If NATO did not exist, we would have to create it"

GBF : What is the purpose of NATO today seen from an American point of view ?

RH : If the US is going to be involved in Western European defense, it will be involved through NATO. NATO now has four purposes:

• to keep America here strategically;

• to keep the 16 member states working together and not going separately;

• to engage Central European countries in Western security; also, in Bosnia, to deal with the only serious fighting we have had in Europe since the end of the second World war; and

• to try draw Russia out of its shell to play a positiverole.

GBF : So there is no reason for NATO to disappear ?

RH : To quote a famous Frenchman, if NATO did not exist, we would have to create it. The most important thing for NATO to do in the future is to be a leading force for producing stability in Central Europe — through the Partnership for Peace, through rapid membership for Central European countries, we will start inviting some of them during the Madrid Summit. Another important task in which NATO contributes is to try to help Russia have a productive future. That’s the biggest concern right now. I might say, at the same time, that supporting a European Security and Defense Identity is another way in which NATO helps to achieve the common goals. All this is agreed by all 16 countries. The American, the French and the Allies position are all the same. That gives the Alliance the strength it has…

GBF : Isn’t it a little bit of a problem not to have an enemy anymore ?

RH : We do have an enemy. It is uncertainty, instability and lack of confidence. We are trying to build confidence so we can preserve what we have here; so we can keep America engaged; and we can help Central Europeans to understand that they have a confident, peaceful future, that their countries will never again be torn apart by war. We also want to give Russia confidence that it can comeinto the outside world to play a productive role. That is a huge agenda for security. You don’t need an enemy in order to have security. In fact, if we end up with producing an enemy, it means that we would have failed.

GBF : How do you plan to bring stability to Russia ? Would you invite Russia into NATO ?

RH : NATO can help bring stability to Russia only in small ways: most depends on what the people of that country are able to do; some depends on the world’s great economic institutions, like the EU, the World Trade Organization, and the old "G-7" that is beeing renamed the "Summit of the Eight". NATO can help Russia through Partnership for Peace and the new, special relationship we are negociating with Moscow. As far as the United States is concerned, the door to NATO membership should remain open for European country that is ready and willing to shoulder the responsibilities of NATO membership. But Russia has not applied for membership; this question is better addressed if and when it does so.

GBF : The last Summit in Helsinki between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin did not leave much hope as for the enlargement of NATO ? Would you still respect the proposed calendar and offer membership to some Central European countries during the Summer ?

RH : The Helsinki Summit between Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin went very well, and NATO and Russia are moving forward to negotiate their special relationship, which we hope can be completed during the Spring. In any event, the NATO Summit in Madrid will take decisions to invite the first Central European countries to join the Alliance, and it will declare that the door remains open to other countries.

The nuclear question

GBF : How do you see the Franco-German declarations to work closely together on the nuclear front ? Will it change the balance within NATO?

RH : These declarations were based upon arrangements agreed on December 9, in Nuremberg, between the two Presidents. The nuclear part of that, the way France and Germany will cooperate, was only a small part. Our general view is that very deep, very close relation-ships between France and Germany are important. They have been important for us over the last fifty years. We are strong supporters of the Eurocorps that started from a Franco-German initiative. We recognize that these arrangements are embedded in broader European security arrangements. They are also embedded in what each country does within its Transatlantic ties, of which we are a part. So we see closer relationships as being in everyone’s interest. We will all gain if France, indeed, is able to complete its strategic design of bringing itself back into the integrated command of NATO. We will then talk with the French on how they see the relationship to NATO of their nuclear weapons.

Propos recueillis par Christine HOLZBAUER-MADISON et Gilles TEISSEYRE

Publié dans la revue du Groupe des Belles Feuilles, l'Année Européenne, en 1997, dans le dossier Diplomatie et sécurité européenne.